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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               
Nos. 07-1531 & 07-1643
                               
HECTOR L. HUERTAS, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF 
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
v.
CITY OF CAMDEN; LUIS PASTORIZA, City of Camden Clerk; GWENDOLYN
FAISON, Mayor; ALI SLOAN-EL, City Councilman; CYRUS P. SAXON, Grants
Administrator; FRANK FULBROOK, Member City Democratic Committee
Hector L. Huertas,
Appellant
                                                    
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Civ. No. 05-cv-05375)
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
                                                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 10, 2007
Before:   FISHER, ALDISERT, and WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: August 14, 2007)
                                  
OPINION
                                   
     1  Huertas has filed a motion seeking to compel appellees to return the appendix that he
served on them.  Huertas has not cited any authority authorizing us to issue such an order,
and we are aware of none.  Accordingly, that motion is denied.
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PER CURIAM
Hector L. Huertas appeals pro se from the final judgment of the District
Court and several of its interlocutory orders.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.1  
I.
Huertas is an Hispanic individual registered to vote in Camden, New Jersey. 
In his Amended Complaint, he alleges that the city and certain city officials have sought
to “dilute” the Hispanic vote in two ways.  First, Huertas claims that Camden has adopted
a majority-vote/runoff requirement that will have the effect of ensuring that African-
American candidates dominate city elections.  Second, he claims that the city has
approved a residential redevelopment plan for its Cramer Hill section.  According to
Huertas, that section is primarily Hispanic, and the redevelopment might have the effect
of displacing Hispanic voters from Camden.  On the basis of these allegations, Huertas
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1983 and 1988.
By order entered September 25, 2006, the District Court (1) granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss the Cramer Hill redevelopment claim for lack of standing,
but allowed the runoff claim to proceed, and (2) denied three motions that Huertas had
filed seeking to further amend his complaint.  By order entered February 16, 2007, the
District Court denied three of Huertas’s motions pertaining solely to his remaining runoff
3claim:  (1) a motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) a motion to strike defendants’
affirmative defenses; and (3) a motion to preliminarily enjoin the city from using the
procedure. Huertas filed a notice of appeal on February 20, 2007, from the February 16
order.  
On February 26, 2007, a Magistrate Judge held a conference on Huertas’s
motion to compel discovery and recover costs as a discovery sanction.  The Magistrate
Judge ordered defendants to produce certain discovery, but denied the request for
sanctions.  Huertas then stated that he wanted to voluntarily dismiss the case with
prejudice, provided that defendants not seek costs from him.  Defendants’ counsel
conducted a colloquy on this issue, and the proceeding is transcribed.  On February 28,
2007, the District Court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).  Huertas then filed a second notice of appeal, seeking to appeal
that order as well as those discussed above.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.   
II.
A.     The District Court’s Jurisdiction
Huertas argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because his claims
should have been heard by a three-judge District Court panel, which Huertas requested in
his second motion to further amend his complaint.  According to Huertas, a three-judge
panel was required by the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(g).  As the District Court
correctly noted, however, Huertas’s claims do not fall within either that provision or the
4general three-judge panel provisions codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284.  Thus, the District
Court was neither required nor authorized to convene a three-judge panel to rule on
Huertas’s claims.  Cf. Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that §
2284 specifies the situations in which a three-judge panel is required). 
B.     The Voluntary Dismissal and the Orders of February 16 and 28
Huertas’s voluntary dismissal raises another threshold question, this one
regarding the scope of this appeal.  “Generally, voluntary dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2)
are not reviewable on appeal.”  Empire Volkswagen Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 814 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987).  See also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677, 680 (1958) (noting “the familiar rule that a plaintiff who has voluntarily
dismissed his complaint may not sue out a writ of error”); United States v. Babbitt, 104
U.S. 767, 768 (1881) (explaining that rule is rooted in the doctrine of waiver) (cited in
Procter & Gamble Co.).  Huertas, however, challenges not merely the fact that his case
was dismissed, but the allegedly-prejudicial process the District Court employed in
dismissing it.  We review that process for abuse of discretion, see Ferguson v. Eakle, 492
F.2d 26, 28-29 (3d Cir. 1974), and find none here. 
According to Huertas, he requested that the dismissal be accomplished by
written stipulation, but defendants’ counsel and the District Court “ignored” this request
by forcing a “colloquy procedure” on him.  Huertas also argues that a stipulation was
necessary to clarify that his voluntary dismissal was contingent on defendants not seeking
costs against him.  These arguments lack merit.  Huertas expressly stated during the
     2  Huertas first sought to appeal this order on February 20, before there was a final
decision of the District Court.  At that time, the only potentially-appealable aspect of the
order was its denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). 
Huertas’s subsequent voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the claim on which that
motion was based might be characterized as having rendered moot his appeal from the
denial of that motion, because there is no longer any possibility that he can show a
likelihood of success on the merits.
5
hearing that he had “no objection” to the District Court entering an order of dismissal
with prejudice on the basis of the colloquy without a separate stipulation.  (Feb. 26, 2007
Trans. at 25:15-22.)  Moreover, defendants’ counsel expressly stated on the record that
the city would not seek costs from Huertas.  (Id. at 25:5-9.)  Huertas thus has waived any
challenge to this procedure, with which he has no real grievance to begin with.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in entering the
February 28 order.  When Huertas requested the dismissal, his runoff claim was still
pending, and none of the District Court’s prior orders had effectively precluded that
claim.  Thus, Huertas has waived any further challenge to the dismissal of his runoff
claim, including any challenge to the District Court’s prior rulings on motions that related
only to that claim.  This means that Huertas has waived any challenge to the February 16
order.2
C.     The September 25 Order
That leaves the September 25 order, which dismissed Huertas’s Cramer Hill
redevelopment claim and denied his motions to further amend his complaint.  Huertas’s
     3  Most Courts of Appeals have concluded that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice
can be used as a vehicle to obtain immediate review of certain interlocutory orders.  See,
e.g., Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1990).  Here,
however, Huertas never stated during the colloquy that he was dismissing his case to
obtain immediate review of any prior ruling.  Cf. Laczy v. Ross Adhesives, 855 F.2d 351,
354 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[O]ne who seeks to come within an exception to this rule [of non-
appealability after a voluntary dismissal] should make his or her intentions known to the
court and opposing parties.”).  Instead, he now argues that he dismissed his case for
financial reasons and because he “felt defeated” by the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his
motion for sanctions.  (Appellant’s Br. at 8, 24, 39.)
     4  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Huertas’s claim
for lack of standing, see Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ne. Pa., 454 F.3d 120,
124 (3d Cir. 2006), and review its denial of his motions to amend for abuse of discretion,
see Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).
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voluntary dismissal of his suit arguably waived any challenge to those rulings as well.3 
Defendants, however, do not so argue, but instead address the challenge on the merits. 
Potential waiver is not a jurisdictional impediment to review, and Huertas (though an
experienced litigator) is proceeding pro se.  Thus, we have given him the benefit of the
doubt and have reviewed his challenge to the September 25 order on the merits.4
Having done so, we agree with the District Court that Huertas lacks
standing to bring this claim.  Huertas is not a resident of Cramer Hill and does not argue
that the proposed plan would affect him directly.  Instead, his claim is that the proposed
plan, if approved and implemented, might displace some indeterminate number of
Hispanics from the city, and thus might have the effect of diluting the Hispanic vote.  We
agree with the District Court that this claim is purely speculative and that Huertas’s
alleged injury is thus too attenuated to confer Article III standing.  See Taliaferro v.
     5  We also note, as did the District Court, that this claim may be moot.  Defendants
have represented that the New Jersey Superior Court disapproved the Cramer Hill re-
development plan and that they have withdrawn it and abandoned their appeal.  Huertas
himself attached various newspaper articles reporting those events to documents he filed
in the District Court.  
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Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188, 191 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that standing
requires, inter alia, an injury that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,”
and affirming dismissal of similar vote dilution claim).5
As for Huertas’s three motions to further amend his complaint, such
motions may be denied if the proposed amendment would be futile (i.e., legally
insufficient).  See Garvin, 354 F.3d at 222.  We agree with the District Court that such is
the case here.  Huertas’s first and third motions sought to add certain allegations
regarding the redevelopment plan, and to name as defendants certain private parties
involved in that plan.  We agree that these proposed amendments are insufficient to
confer standing.  Huertas’s second motion requested a three-judge panel, which, as
explained above, was neither authorized nor required under these circumstances.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.
